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Introduction
Current British abortion law combines criminal prohibitions 
against abortion with an exception, carved out by the Abortion 
Act 1967, which provides that these offences do not apply 
where an abortion is performed in line with its requirements 
(see Chapter One). In the event of decriminalisation, the 
Abortion Act would necessarily be either very radically 
revised or repealed in its entirety alongside the removal of 
the criminal prohibitions. This has led some to worry that 
important safeguards against unethical or unsafe practice 
would be lost (for example, Caulfield, 2017: cols 30–1). In 
this chapter, we consider the basis for such concerns in the 
light of the legal regulation that would continue to apply 
following decriminalisation. We concentrate on the law of 
England, Wales and Scotland. Northern Ireland, where the 
Abortion Act has never applied, will be considered separately 
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As we will show, the concern that decriminalisation amounts 
to deregulation is misplaced. Rather, abortion services are 
already (and would remain) subject to a dense web of other 
regulation, including general provisions of criminal and civil 
law, licensing and inspection requirements, and professional 
oversight (see further BMA, 2019). We begin by setting out 
the regulatory framework that is designed to promote good 
governance and high quality, patient- centred care in health 
services. We then move on to focus, in particular, on two issues 
that have provoked concern in the context of abortion services. 
First, we explain how the robust regulation of informed consent, 
confidentiality, counselling and safeguarding would be ensured 
following decriminalisation. Second, with a large majority 
of abortions now performed using medicines, we outline 
how access to abortion pills would be controlled. Finally, we 
turn to two specific cases that fall outside mainstream health 
practice: where a woman loses a desired pregnancy due to an 
assault or the non- consensual administration of pills; and where a 
backstreet abortion is performed by a professionally unqualified 
abortionist. Here, we suggest, where criminal sanction may 
remain appropriate, specific abortion offences are unnecessary 
as existing general principles of criminal law are sufficient to 
support prosecutions of morally culpable or dangerous conduct.
A general regulatory framework for safe care
It is rare to enshrine in statute law – as was done in the Abortion 
Act 1967 – restrictions on where, how and by whom a specific 
medical procedure can be authorised and performed. However, 
this does not mean that other modern medicine is practised 
within a legal vacuum. Rather, healthcare services are subject 
to significant and detailed regulation  – including general 
requirements of civil and criminal law, licensing requirements 
and professional norms backed by disciplinary sanction  – 
which foregrounds a concern with ensuring patient safety and 
promoting best practice. Abortion services are already subject 
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to the requirements of this general framework and would 
remain so following decriminalisation.
First, it is a criminal offence to conduct any ‘regulated 
activity’ involving the provision of health or social care  – 
including abortion services – without first being registered 
for this purpose. The relevant law differs slightly in its detail 
between England, Wales and Scotland. However, in each 
jurisdiction, registration depends on meeting detailed safety, 
quality and governance standards, with ongoing compliance 
monitored through inspection visits. In England, for example, 
providers of a regulated activity are subject to the detailed 
requirements laid down in the Care Quality Commission 
(Registration) Regulations 2009 and the Health and Social 
Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014. These 
provide that service users must be treated with dignity and 
respect and safeguarded from abuse and improper treatment; 
that care and treatment must be provided in a safe way, with 
adequate staffing and good governance demonstrated; and 
that all equipment and premises must be properly maintained 
and suitable. In addition to these general requirements, which 
apply to all regulated services, this framework also offers a more 
flexible and easily updated mechanism for the imposition of 
requirements on specific areas of practice. For example, non- 
NHS abortion service providers are required to meet specified 
standards with regard to record keeping and the treatment of 
fetal tissue under the Care Quality Commission (Registration) 
Regulations 2009.1
Compliance with these requirements is overseen by the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC), which has a duty to inspect 
service providers under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. 
Where an abortion service provider falls below any of the 
standards set out in regulation, the CQC can serve improvement 
notices, cancel or alter a service provider’s registration, and – in 
the most serious cases – bring prosecutions. Similar licensing, 
inspection and enforcement mechanisms operate in Wales, 
overseen by the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales (Care Standards 
 
DECRIMINALISING ABORTION IN THE UK
60
Act 2000; Registration of Social Care and Independent 
Health Care (Wales) Regulations 2002; Independent Health 
Care (Wales) Regulations 2011), and in Scotland by Health 
Improvement Scotland (NHS (Scotland) Act 1978; Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (Requirements as to Independent 
Health Care Services) Regulations 2011).
Second, professional bodies exercise significant oversight 
over healthcare practice. Doctors are regulated by the General 
Medical Council, which operates with the overriding function 
of protecting, promoting and maintaining the health and 
safety of the public (Medical Act 1983). The General Medical 
Council issues a range of general guidelines that have relevance 
to abortion care (for example, GMC, 2007; 2008; 2012; 
2013a; 2013b). Where the conduct of a doctor is found to 
pose a risk to the safety of patients or public confidence in 
doctors, the General Medical Council can suspend a doctor’s 
right to work, require him or her to work under supervision 
or to undergo further training, or withdraw his or her licence 
to practice medicine. Likewise, the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council exercises oversight over nurses, midwives and nursing 
associates, who are required – again at risk of losing their right 
to practice – to act in accordance with the requirements to 
prioritise people, to practise effectively, to preserve safety, and 
to promote professionalism and trust (NMC, 2018).
Abortion service providers are also required to follow the 
detailed guidance offered by expert and professional bodies 
(or to offer a compelling explanation for any departure from 
it). The providers of a regulated activity are required to take 
account of any nationally recognised guidance relating to the 
services that they deliver (Regulation 12, Health and Social 
Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014). 
Likewise, the General Medical Council expects doctors to 
demonstrate the maintenance of their skills, requiring an 
awareness of, and an adherence to, professional guidelines 
(GMC, 2013a). These two mechanisms give regulatory teeth to 
the detailed and comprehensive best practice guidelines on the 
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organisation of abortion services, different abortion methods, 
and information to be given to patients produced by the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG, 2011b) 
and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE, 2019), along with any guidance regarding specific 
aspects of services (for example, RCOG, 2010a; 2010b).
Third, it is important that women accessing abortion services 
are protected by the same principles of civil and criminal law 
that apply in the context of any other health service, since no 
regulatory framework, however robust, has ever succeeded in 
fully avoiding human error. Notably, all health professionals owe 
a duty of care to their patients and, where they fall below the 
standard of care that might reasonably be expected and a patient 
suffers harm as a result, they can be sued in negligence (Bolam 
1957; Bolitho 1998). In the most serious cases, there may also 
be the possibility of a criminal prosecution for wilful neglect 
(sections 20– 21, Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015); for 
health and safety offences (section 7, Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974); or for gross negligence manslaughter (R v Adomako 
1994; R v Misra 2004). Those accessing NHS abortion services 
also have recourse to the general NHS complaints system.
Currently, independent sector abortion service providers 
are also subject to a separate approval process under section 
1(3) of the Abortion Act 1967 that significantly predates, 
and today operates in parallel with, the general registration 
process for those offering a ‘regulated activity’. This further 
approval process requires that service providers demonstrate 
their adherence to the terms of the Abortion Act; to the 
general requirements imposed on those who offer ‘regulated 
activities’; and to the Department of Health’s Required Standard 
Operating Procedures (RSOPs) (DH, 2014). If abortion were 
to be decriminalised, this additional approval process would 
likely disappear along with the other restrictions enshrined 
in the Abortion Act. While this would have the welcome 
consequence of sweeping away the unnecessary bureaucracy of 
two parallel approval processes, there is no reason to anticipate 
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that it would compromise important safeguards regarding 
patient safety. On the contrary, scrutiny of the RSOPs – the 
large part of which is devoted to listing regulatory requirements 
that have independent force – illustrates the extent to which 
the legal framework for ensuring high quality abortion care is 
already to be found in general provisions of law and not in the 
specific framework governing abortion. As explained in this 
chapter, these provisions would continue to apply following 
any process of decriminalisation.
Informed consent, counselling, confidentiality and safeguarding
While it is important to make robust provision within abortion 
services for informed consent, confidentiality, safeguarding 
and access to counselling for those women who want it, the 
current criminal law framework plays no role in this regard. 
When two doctors certify that they believe, in good faith, 
that a woman’s circumstances fit within one of the statutory 
grounds in the Abortion Act 1967, they are not playing any 
role in ensuring that the woman has voluntarily given informed 
consent to the termination. Or, if woman lacks capacity, it is 
not the Abortion Act which charges doctors with ensuring 
that a termination is carried out only if it would be in her 
best interests. If abortion were to be decriminalised, other 
mechanisms would continue to be in place to ensure that 
women voluntarily give informed consent to termination, 
and that the best interests of women who lack capacity are 
protected. Similarly, the confidentiality of a patient’s abortion 
records is not protected by the Abortion Act, but by the rules 
which apply to all other sensitive information about a patient’s 
medical treatment.
Informed consent and safeguarding
To carry out any medical procedure which involves touching, 
without the patient’s informed consent, is a battery and 
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an assault. Consent will be valid if it is given voluntarily, 
by someone who has the capacity to consent, and who 
understands, in broad terms, what the treatment involves. 
Hence, even if abortion is taken out of the criminal law, 
if a termination is carried out on a woman who has not 
voluntarily consented to it, she would not only have a civil 
claim in battery and in negligence, but also the person who 
carried out the termination would be likely to face a criminal 
charge of assault.
If a doctor were to suspect that a woman seeking an abortion 
was being pressurised by her partner or another family member, 
and that she did not, in fact, wish to terminate her pregnancy, 
he or she could not be confident that the woman had given 
a valid consent to termination. Doctors cannot rely upon a 
consent which has not been given voluntarily. So if a doctor 
were to terminate a pregnancy when he or she knows, or ought 
to have known, that the woman was not freely consenting to 
it, then he or she might be found to have committed both the 
tort of battery and the crime of assault.
Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated 
Activities) Regulations 2010, regulation 18, the registered 
person must have suitable arrangements in place for obtaining, 
and acting in accordance with, the consent of service users 
in relation to the care and treatment provided for them. In 
addition to these legal requirements to ensure that the person 
receiving medical treatment has consented to it, the CQC’s 
Inspection Framework for Termination of Pregnancy (CQC, 
2018) further requires providers to demonstrate that they ensure 
that women attending for abortion are certain of their decision, 
understand its implications and are seeking abortion voluntarily. 
If the pregnant woman does not speak English, relying upon 
her partner or another family member to translate for her is not 
good practice, and the CQC’s framework prompts inspectors 
to ask whether in ‘areas where ethnic minority groups form a 
significant proportion of the local population, are processes in 
place to aide translation during the consent process?’
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Providers are likewise required to demonstrate that clinicians 
who care for women requesting abortion ‘should be able to 
identify those who require more support than can be provided 
in the routine abortion service setting, for example young 
women, those with a pre- existing mental health condition, 
those who are subject to sexual violence or poor social support, 
or where there is evidence of coercion’ (CQC, 2018; see 
further, RCOG, 2011b).
In addition to these abortion- specific requirements, doctors’ 
ordinary responsibilities for safeguarding vulnerable adults and 
children would continue to apply after decriminalisation. If a 
doctor suspects that a child or an adult who lacks capacity is 
subject to abuse or neglect, he or she has a duty to inform the 
appropriate agency. For adults who have capacity, the duty is 
to work with the patient in order to help him or her to seek 
appropriate help, although in exceptional circumstances, where 
there is clear evidence of an imminent risk of serious harm to 
the individual, it can be appropriate to disclose information 
without her consent (RCPCH, 2014; HM Government, 2018).
Doctors’ responsibility for obtaining informed consent 
from their patients is increasingly regarded as an aspect of 
the partnership model of medical decision- making, whereby 
both the doctor and the patient have expertise to bring to a 
decision about what medical treatment is appropriate (GMC, 
2008; Montgomery v Lanarkshire 2015). Doctors have specialist 
skills in diagnosis and treatment, and they are sources of expert 
advice on the risks and benefits of different procedures, but the 
decision about what treatment is best for the individual patient, 
in the light of her priorities and interests, is ultimately one 
which the patient is uniquely well- placed to make for herself. 
For example, let us imagine that a serious fetal abnormality is 
detected at the 20- week anomaly scan. The doctor can advise 
the woman of the implications of that abnormality for a child’s 
health and wellbeing but the pregnant woman knows better 
than the doctor how well she and her family would cope with 
the care of a child with that condition.
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There is also a considerable body of good practice guidance 
which helps doctors to understand what the partnership model 
of medical decision- making involves. The General Medical 
Council’s Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together 
instructs doctors that, ‘you must work in partnership with 
your patients to ensure good care’, and that, in so doing, they 
must ‘listen to patients and respect their views about their 
health’, ‘maximise patients’ opportunities, and their ability, to 
make decisions for themselves’, and ‘respect patients’ decisions’ 
(GMC, 2008).
The partnership model also applies to abortion and 
doctors will discuss the risks, side- effects and implications 
of abortion with the pregnant woman, who will be able to 
weigh up whether termination is the best decision for her. 
However, in theory, this is superseded by the requirement 
under the Abortion Act that two doctors, rather than the 
woman herself, must determine whether termination poses 
less risk to her health than continuing the pregnancy. This 
is wholly at odds with modern medical practice. It casts an 
intimate medical decision as one which is not to be made 
by the patient herself, in the light of her own priorities and 
values, but as one that is to be made paternalistically, on her 
behalf, by two doctors.
Girls and women who lack capacity
The Abortion Act 1967 plays no role at all in protecting the 
interests of girls and women who lack capacity, whose interests 
are instead protected by the common law, by statute and by 
good practice guidance, all of which would continue to be in 
place if abortion were to be decriminalised.
Under 18s
If a girl is 16 or 17  years old, she is able to give a valid 
consent to termination, in the same way as if she were an 
adult (under the Family Law Reform Act 1969 in England 
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and Wales, and under the Age of Legal Capacity Act 1991 in 
Scotland). If she is under 16, but has sufficient understanding 
in order to make a decision for herself (Gillick 1986; Age of 
Legal Capacity Act 1991: section 2(4)), she can give a valid 
consent to abortion. She also has a right of confidentiality 
in relation to her termination, which means that her parents 
have no right to be consulted or informed (Gillick 1986; 
Axon 2006).
Parents can take medical decisions for children who are 
not yet Gillick- competent (England and Wales), or ‘capable 
of understanding the nature and possible consequences of the 
procedure or treatment’ (Scotland), subject to the possibility 
of being overruled by the court if the decision they wish to 
take is not in the child’s best interests. In practice, however, the 
courts have been clear that it would be very difficult to imagine 
the circumstances in which it would be in the best interests of 
a girl who lacks capacity to terminate her pregnancy against 
her wishes, or, conversely, to force her to carry her unwanted 
pregnancy to term (Re X (A Child) 2014).
Adults who lack capacity
Where an adult pregnant woman lacks capacity, then under 
the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 in England and Wales 
and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, decisions 
about her pregnancy, including the decision to terminate it, 
should be made in her best interests (in the language of the 
MCA), or in order to benefit the woman (in the language 
of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act). Unlike non- 
therapeutic sterilisation, abortion is not one of the special cases 
for which court approval should be sought routinely. Rather, 
the decision should be brought before the Court of Protection 
in England and Wales or the Court of Session in Scotland only 
where there is doubt over whether the woman lacks capacity, 
or whether termination is in her best interests (An NHS Trust 
v D 2003; SCIE, 2011).
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When deciding whether termination is in the best interests 
of a pregnant woman who lacks capacity, her wishes and 
feelings are of central importance (Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) 2000, section 1(4)(a); MCA 2005, section 4(6); 
Re AB (Termination of Pregnancy) 2019). That means that 
even if a woman would be unable to look after her baby, 
and the local authority would be likely to take the child into 
care immediately after birth, if a woman does not want a 
termination, it is very unlikely to be in her best interests (Re 
AB (Termination of Pregnancy) 2019). As King LJ has explained, 
‘carrying out a termination absent a woman’s consent is a most 
profound invasion of her Article 8 rights’ (Re AB (Termination 
of Pregnancy) 2019).
It is important to remember that – unlike any other medical 
procedure – where a decision is made by the woman’s treating 
doctor, or by a court, that termination is in the woman’s best 
interests, this is currently insufficient for the procedure to go 
ahead. Rather, in addition, the Abortion Act requires two 
doctors to certify that the woman’s circumstances also fit within 
the statutory grounds. It could be argued that if the UK’s 
capacity legislation is thought to offer sufficient protection to 
vulnerable women in the context of sterilisation, organ donation 
and the withdrawal of life- prolonging treatment, it is odd that a 
decision which has been taken in the woman’s best interests (in 
England and Wales), or in order to benefit her (in Scotland), is 
not likewise the end of the matter in relation to termination.
Counselling
All women requesting an abortion should be offered the 
opportunity to discuss their options and choices with a 
trained counsellor, with this offer repeated at every stage of 
the care pathway and post- abortion counselling available for 
those women who request it. No provision for this is made in 
the Abortion Act. Rather, these requirements are enshrined 
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in professional guidelines (RCOG, 2011b; NICE, 2019) 
and regulation (CQC, 2018). Following decriminalisation, 
provision for counselling would thus continue in exactly the 
same way as currently.
Confidentiality and data protection
Information about a woman’s termination of pregnancy is 
undoubtedly sensitive personal information, and further 
disclosure of it is protected at common law, by her right 
to privacy under the Human Rights Act 1998, and by the 
General Data Protection Regulation 2018. Under the Abortion 
Regulations 1991, every abortion must be reported to the 
appropriate Chief Medical Officer, and the Regulations place 
restrictions upon any further disclosure of this information. If 
abortion were to be decriminalised, this is not a reason to stop 
collecting data about the incidence of abortion in England, 
Scotland and Wales, and similar reporting duties could be 
imposed through a new set of Regulations.
Regulation of abortion medicines
In 2018, 71 per cent of abortions performed in England and 
Wales and 86 per cent of those in Scotland were medical rather 
than surgical (DHSC, 2019a; ISD, 2019). Medical abortions 
involve the sequential administration of two prescription- 
only medicines, mifepristone and misoprostol, in order to 
end the pregnancy and trigger a miscarriage. If abortion 
were to be decriminalised, the law which applies to the 
provision of prescription- only medicines would continue to 
impose considerable restrictions upon the supply and use of 
mifepristone and misoprostol.
Medicines can only receive a marketing authorisation under 
the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 if they are proved to 
be safe and effective. The Human Medicines Regulations also 
ensure that medicines which are supplied for human use meet 
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appropriate quality standards. Supplying counterfeit or fake 
medicines is a criminal offence under statute in England and 
Wales (section 2, Fraud Act 2006) and common law in Scotland.
Medicines are classified as ‘prescription only’ in order to 
ensure that only properly qualified and registered healthcare 
professionals act as gatekeepers to anyone wishing to access 
them. The General Medical Council’s good practice guidance 
for doctors specifies that doctors must not prescribe any 
medicines unless they have ‘adequate knowledge of the patient’s 
health, and are satisfied that the drugs or treatment serve the 
patient’s needs’ (GMC, 2013a: para 16(a)).
It is a criminal offence for someone who is not properly 
qualified and registered to prescribe and supply a prescription- 
only medicine (regulation 214, Human Medicines Regulations 
2012). Hence the owners of any ‘online pharmacy’, which 
claims to sell mifepristone and misoprostol without a 
prescription would be committing a criminal offence in the 
UK. In practice, such websites are often based overseas, and it 
is therefore more difficult for the UK regulator of medicines, 
the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) to control their activities. If the website is registered 
in another country, the MHRA would inform the relevant 
regulatory authority in that country.
There are also restrictions upon advertising. Prescription- 
only medicines cannot be directly marketed to consumers, 
and regulation 283 of the Human Medicines Regulations 
2012 further provides that ‘A person may not publish an 
advertisement that is likely to lead to the use of a medicinal 
product for the purpose of inducing an abortion’.
Non- consensual termination of pregnancy
The current law has little difficulty in dealing with cases where 
the defendant terminates, or seeks to terminate, the victim’s 
pregnancy without her consent. Indeed, in recent years, in 
England and Wales, the primary use for the offences under 
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section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 has been in cases where 
the defendant causes a woman (frequently his former or current 
sexual partner) to lose a wanted pregnancy. For example, in R 
v Magira 2008, a husband, who was unhappy about his wife’s 
pregnancy, mixed abortion pills into her food without her 
knowledge, which made her ill, but did not cause a miscarriage. 
He was convicted of administering a poison or noxious thing 
with intent to secure a miscarriage under section 58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act. He received three years and 
nine months’ imprisonment.
Even if those offences were abolished, however, other 
offences are committed in such cases. The general offences of 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm (section 47, Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861) and causing/ inflicting grievous 
bodily harm (sections 18 or 20, Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861)  apply. Under the current law, grievous bodily 
harm has been defined as really serious bodily harm and it 
is left to the jury to determine if an injury falls within that 
description (R v Bollom 2003). It seems very likely that a jury 
would conclude that a non- consensual termination would 
constitute grievous bodily harm and, indeed, it seems in the 
reported cases that they have been willing to do so. In R v 
Wilson 2016, the defendant attacked the pregnant victim (his 
former sexual partner), deliberately stamping on her stomach. 
He was convicted of intentional infliction of grievous bodily 
harm (as well as ‘child destruction’ under the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act 1929). Indeed, in such cases it can be easier 
to charge one of the general assault offences than to rely on 
section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act or the Infant 
Life (Preservation) Act, because there is no need to prove that 
the defendant knew the victim was pregnant or that he was 
intending to terminate the pregnancy.
The poisoning offences found in sections 23 and 24 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 are also important 
here. Section 24 states that ‘whosoever shall unlawfully and 
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maliciously administer to or cause to be administered to or 
taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or 
noxious thing, with intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy such 
person’ is guilty of an offence. Section 23 is similarly worded 
but covers cases where the victim’s life is endangered or they 
suffer grievous bodily harm. A very senior judge, Munby J 
(as he then was) seems to have accepted obiter dicta that these 
offences could be used to punish a defendant who had sought 
to terminate a victim’s pregnancy without her consent through 
the surreptitious administration of pills (R (Smeaton) 2002: 
para 274).
There is, therefore, plenty of scope within the current 
criminal law to deal with cases where a defendant is seeking to 
terminate a victim’s pregnancy without her consent. Indeed, 
we cannot imagine such a case where a criminal offence 
would not be committed, even if section 58 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 
were abolished. While it is thus highly unlikely that such an 
amendment is required, if Parliament deemed it desirable for 
the removal of any doubt, it might nonetheless choose to amend 
the existing offences to provide explicitly that the surreptitious 
administration of pills falls within the poisoning offences 
and that an assault on a pregnant woman that terminated a 
pregnancy would be treated in law as ‘grievous bodily harm’. 
This latter proposal was made by the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission (VLRC, 2008: 8), which suggested accompanying 
decriminalisation of abortion with an amendment to the law 
criminalising the causing of serious injuries. This provided 
that ‘[s] erious injury includes: the destruction (other than in 
the course of a medical procedure) of the fetus of a pregnant 
woman, whether or not the woman suffers any other harm’.
Reform in relation to sentencing might also be considered, 
though again, in our view, this is not necessary as the matter 
is adequately dealt with by the current law. A defendant who 
attacked a pregnant woman, terminating her pregnancy, 
could be charged with the same offences under sections 23 
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or 24 as could a defendant who attacked a woman who was 
not pregnant. However, under the current law, the loss of a 
wanted pregnancy will be treated as an aggravating feature 
which would indicate an increased sentence. In R v Wilson 
2016, an 18- year sentence was held to be justified, with the 
court placing particular weight on the intentional termination 
of the pregnancy through the attack. The maximum sentence 
for intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm is life and 
so this sentence could have been imposed even without a 
conviction under the 1929 Act.
Medically unqualified providers
It has been questioned whether, if the relevant offences 
under the Offences Against the Person Act and Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act (in England and Wales) and the common 
law (in Scotland) were abolished, it would then become lawful 
for someone who does not have the appropriate qualifications 
or training to provide an abortion (Caulfield, 2017 30– 1). 
There are two main reasons why this should not be a concern.
First, it is an offence to falsely pretend to be a doctor, nurse, 
or midwife (section 49 of the Medical Act 1983; section 44 
of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001; and, for England 
and Wales, section 2 Fraud Act 2006). That would clearly 
cover anyone who was purporting to be medically qualified 
at performing abortions, but in fact was not. It would not, 
however, apply to someone who was open about not having 
any medical qualifications.
Second, as confirmed in the infamous decision of the House 
of Lords in R v Brown 1993, any medical procedure that involves 
contact with the body of a patient is prima facie a criminal 
offence. It could be an assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
(section 47, Offences Against the Person Act) or inflicting/ 
causing of grievous bodily harm (sections 18 and 20 Offences 
Against the Person Act), depending on the severity of the harm. 
However, for such offences, the consent of the patient only 
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provides a defence in a list of exceptional circumstances, one 
of which is ‘reasonable surgical interference’. The precise scope 
of this exception was considered by the Court of Appeal in R 
v BM 2018, which concerned a tattooist who had engaged in 
body modification (including ear removal and tongue splitting) 
on clients with their consent. When charged with offences 
of causing grievous bodily harm, he sought to rely on the 
medical treatment exception. The Court of Appeal rejected 
this defence, explaining it could not be used by people not 
qualified to practise surgery:
elective surgery would only be reasonable if carried out 
by someone qualified to perform it. The professional and 
regulatory superstructure which governs how doctors 
and other medical professionals practice [sic] is there to 
protect the public. The protections provided to patients, 
some of which are referred to in the medical evidence 
before the judge, were not available to the appellant’s 
customers or more widely to the customers of those who 
set themselves up as body modifiers. (para 42)
The Court of Appeal went on to explain that those lacking 
medical qualifications were not in a position to ensure that the 
patients had the capacity to make the decision to consent to the 
treatment, or had been properly informed of the risks. Notably, 
they explained that the fact the ‘surgery’ was performed with 
skill and in sterile conditions did not affect their decision. Nor 
was the fact the clients were willing to consent to the treatment, 
knowing the defendant was not medically qualified. This case 
makes it clear that a person who performs a surgical termination 
of pregnancy, which would otherwise be an assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm will be guilty of 
an offence under the Offences Against the Person Act because 
they cannot rely on the medical treatment exception.
There is, perhaps, one issue of debate. It is only necessary 
to rely on the medical treatment exception if the treatment 
DECRIMINALISING ABORTION IN THE UK
74
involves actual bodily harm or a more serious harm. While 
later abortions performed by dilatation and evacuation would 
certainly fall into that category it might be questioned whether 
earlier procedures performed by vacuum aspiration procedures 
would also do so. Actual bodily harm has been defined by the 
courts as any hurt which interferes with the health or comfort 
of the victim, which is more than transient and trifling (R 
v Chan Fook 1994). The approach taken by the House of 
Lords in Brown is that this is assessed without taking into 
account the consent of victim. Given the courts’ emphasis on 
ensuring that medical procedures are offered by those trained 
to ensure informed consent, it seems likely that even a safely 
performed vacuum aspiration procedure would constitute a 
bodily interference which is more than transient and trifling. 
It should also be remembered that, as outlined earlier, abortion 
is a ‘regulated activity’, meaning that it is a criminal offence to 
offer services without first being registered to do so.
Conscientious objection
Finally, it should be noted that the Abortion Act also offers a 
safeguard designed to protect the interests of those healthcare 
professionals who are opposed to abortion for religious or 
moral reasons, providing that ‘no person shall be under any 
duty … to participate in any treatment authorised by this 
Act to which he has a conscientious objection’ (section 4(1), 
Abortion Act 1967). If abortion were to be decriminalised, 
abortions would no longer be ‘authorised by this Act’ and 
statutory protection of conscientious objection rights would 
thereby disappear.
It is a moot point whether statutory protection of 
conscientious objection rights is necessary. Notably, the 
statutory right does not cover those doctors who choose to opt 
out of certifying that an abortion is justified under the Abortion 
Act, as certification must legally take place before treatment for 
the termination of pregnancy begins and thus cannot logically 
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constitute ‘participation in any treatment’ (Doogan 2014: para 
36; Janaway 1989: 572). Nonetheless, doctors’ right to opt out 
of certification is widely respected in practice and is entrenched 
in employment law, the contractual arrangements made by 
the NHS with GPs and the employment contracts made with 
hospital doctors (Doogan 2014: para 36).
Whether or not to entrench a statutory right of conscientious 
objection post- decriminalisation would be a matter for 
Parliament. The Abortion Bill 2018, sponsored by Diana 
Johnson, made such provision.
Conclusion
If the specific criminal offences against abortion in England, 
Wales and Scotland were to be abolished, the Abortion Act 
would become redundant and should thus also be repealed. 
Such moves would necessarily be the result of statutory reform, 
allowing Parliament the opportunity to retain any provisions 
of the Act that it believes to serve an ongoing purpose. For 
example, Parliament might choose to make specific provision 
for conscientious objection. While in our view this is not 
necessary, Parliament might also amend existing assault and 
poisoning offences to put beyond any doubt that they apply 
to non- consensual abortion.
In other respects, as we have described earlier in the chapter, 
abortion is – and would remain – subject to a dense web of 
other regulation. It is these provisions which already do the 
important work of ensuring that services are of a high quality; 
and that they are offered with close attention to the need for 
robust consent, confidentiality, counselling and safeguarding. 
In rare cases – involving non- consensual or unsafe abortions 
offered by unqualified providers – criminal sanction would 
remain appropriate. As previously described, in our view, it is 
already so available under the general provisions of criminal law.
We have not sought to address moral, theological or 
political arguments regarding the decriminalisation of 
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abortion. We have, however, demonstrated that any concern 
that abortion would be left unregulated following such a 
reform are ungrounded and should therefore not play a role 
in those debates.
In sum, decriminalisation does not amount to deregulation.
